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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CRAIG BURR AND LOWELL CLARK, ) BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
) CRAIG BURR AND LOWELL CLARK
Petitioners,
)
vs.

)

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS and THE CAREER
SERVICE REVIEW BOARD, of
the State of Utah,

)
)
)
)

Respondent/Agencies. )
)

Case No. 20040162 CA

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS, CRAIG BURR ANE) LOWELL CLARK
APPEAL FROM THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW :BOARD

I.
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2) (a) confers jurisdiction
upon the Court of Appeals to review cases involving the
appeal from the final orders from formal adjudication
proceedings of state agencies.
II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the Career Service Review Board

("CSRB") violate the "whole record" test by improperly
"correcting" the Step 5 Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact
when the Finding in question involves credibility issues?
This issue was preserved below at R.564-565.
Standard of Review:

This issue is one of general

law and is to be analyzed for correctness with no deference
given to the trial court's decision.

Zissi v. State Tax

Comm'n of Utah, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992); Morton Int'l v.
Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581
(Utah 1991); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d
23, 27 (Utah App.Ct. 1991).
2.

Did the CSRB err by making a new Finding of Fact

that is unsupported by the record and thereafter improperly
engaging in speculation as to the Department of Corrections'
purported justification(s) for inequitably compensating Burr
and Clark?

This issue was preserved below at R.565.

Standard of Review This issue is one of general
law and is to be analyzed for correctness with no deference
given to the trial court's decision.

Zissi v. State Tax

Comm'n of Utah, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992); Morton Int'l v.
Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581
(Utah 1991); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d
2

23, 27 (Utah App.Ct. 1991).
3.

Did the CSRB err by failing to determine that Pete

Haun, Executive Director of the Utah Department of
Corrections acted contrary to the agency's prior practice
and/or arbitrarily and capriciously, by refusing to grant
Petitioners Craig Burr and Lowell Clark (uBurr and Clark")
their requested remedy of four (4) Step salary increase when
E.D. Haun had previously granted pay increases to other
employees of the Utah Department of Corrections to correct
pay inequities?

This issue was preserved below at R.4 68-

473.
Standard of Review:

The issue of the application of

statutes to the facts at bar is one of general law and is to
be analyzed for correctness with no deference given to the
trial court's decision below.

The issue regarding whether

E.D. Haun's decision violated prior practice or was
otherwise arbitrary and capricious, is initially reviewed
for correctness but the burden is then shifted to the Utah
Department of Corrections to justify its departure from its
prior practice on the basis of reasonableness and
3

rationality.

Taylor v. Dep't of Commerce, 952 P.2d 1090

(Utah Ct. App. 1998); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney,
818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah Ct.App. 1991).
4.

Did the CSRB err by determining that the

Department of Resource Management ("DHRM") has sole
responsibility for remedying pay inequities?

This issue was

preserved below at R.466-468.
Standard of Review:

This issue is one of general

law and is to be analyzed for correctness with no deference
given to the trial court's decision.

Zissi v. State Tax

Comm 7 n of Utah, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992); Morton Int'l v.
Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581
(Utah 1991); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d
23, 27 (Utah App.Ct. 1991).
5.

Did the CSRB err by determining that career

service employees are not entitled to equitable application
of their salary range under the statutory framework
requiring "equal pay for equal work" (U.C.A. 67-1912(3)(a)), "equitable application" of salary ranges (67-1912(3) (b)) , and "equitable and competitive compensation" (67-

4

19-3.1(1)(b))? This issue was preserved below at R.460-462.
Standard of Review:

This issue is one of general

law and is to be analyzed for correctness with no deference
given to the trial court's decision.

Zissi v. State Tax

Comm'n of Utah, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992); Morton Int'l v.
Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581
(Utah 1991); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d
23, 27 (Utah App.Ct. 1991).
III.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS/
STATUES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
The following statutes and rules are applicable to the
case on appeal and each of the following are set forth in
the text of the Argument hereinafter (pursuant to Rule 24(f)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure):
1. Constitutional provisions: N/A.
2. Statutes:
a. U.C.A. 63-46b-16(4) (h) (1988) .
M 4 ) The appellate court shall grant relief
only if, on the basis of the agency's record,
it determines that a person seeking judicial
review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:

5

(h) the agency action is:
(i)
an abuse of discretion delegated to
the agency by statute;
(ii)
contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency7 s prior
practice, unless the agency
justifies the inconsistency by
giving facts and reason that
demonstrate a fair and rational
basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv)

otherwise arbitrary or capricious."
U.C.A. 63-46(b)-16 (4) (h) (1988) .
(Emphasis supplied).

U.C.A. 67-19-3.1(1) (b) (2000) :
"67-19-3.1. Principles governing
interpretation of chapter and adoption of
rules.
(1) The department shall establish a career
service system designed in a manner that will
provide for the effective implementation of
the following merit principles:
(b) providing for equitable and competitive
compensation." Utah Code Annotated 67-193.1(1) (b) (2000) . (Emphasis supplied) .
U.C.A. 67-19-12(3)(a)(1997):
xv

(3) (a) The director shall prepare, maintain,
and revise a position classification plan for
each employee position not exempted under
Subsection (2) to provide equal pay for equal
work." Utah Code Annotated 67-1912(3) (a) (1997) (Emphasis supplied) .
U.C.A. 67-19-12(3)(b)(1997):
M3)(b) Classification of positions shall be

z

based upon similarity of duties performed and
responsibilities assumed, so that the same job
requirements and the same salary range may be
applied equitably to each position in the same
class." (Emphasis supplied).
3. Administrative Rules:
a. CSRB Rule 137-1-21(3) (2003) :
xx

(3) Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearing. An
evidentiary/step 5 hearing shall be a new
hearing for the record according to
Subsections 67-19a-406 (1) and (2), held de
novo, with both parties being granted full
administrative process as follows:
(a) The CSRB hearing officer shall first
make factual findings based solely on the
evidence presented at the hearing without
deference to any prior factual findings of the
agency. The CSRB hearing officer shall then
determine whether:
(i) the factual findings made from
the evidentiary/step 5 hearing support
with substantial evidence the allegations
made by the agency or the appointing
authority, and
(ii) the agency has correctly
applied relevant policies, rules, and
statutes.
(b) When the CSRB hearing officer
determines in accordance with the procedures
set forth above that the evidentiary/step 5
factual findings support the allegations of
the agency or the appointing authority, then
the CSRB hearing officer must determine
whether the agency's decision, including any
disciplinary sanctions imposed, is excessive,
disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an
7

abuse of discretion. In making this latter
determination, the CSRB hearing officer shall
give deference to the decision of the agency
or the appointing authority unless the
agency's penalty is determined to be
excessive, disproportionate or constitutes an
abuse of discretion in which instance the CSRB
hearing officer shall determine the
appropriate remedy.
b. CSRB Rule 137-1-22 (4) (a) (2003) :
(4) The Board's Standards of Review. The
board's standards of review based upon the
following criteria:
(a) The board shall first make a determination
whether the factual findings of the CSRB
hearing officer are reasonable and rational
according to the substantial evidence standard.
When the board determines that the factual
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are not
reasonable and rational based on the
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the
board may, in its discretion, correct the
factual findings, and also make new or
additional factual findings."
c. DHRM Rule 477-7-4 (11) (c) (iii) (2000) :

(11) Administrative Salary Increase.
The executive director or commissioner
authorizes and approves Administrative
Salary increases under the following
parameters:
(c) Justifications for Administrative
Salary Increases shall be:
(iii) Supported by issues such as:
special agency conditions or problems,
8

equity issues, or other unique situations
or considerations in the agency."
IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

CASE NATURE, COURSE, PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
Petitioner's Craig Burr and Lowell Clark (herein "Burr

and Clark") filed their grievance requesting a four step pay
increase based on their pay inequity on May 28, 1998.

R.l.

Then Executive Director Pete Haun denied Burr and Clark's
grievance on July 18, 2 000.

R.3 9-40.

Burr and Clark timely

advanced their grievance to the Career Service Review Board
on or about August 11, 2000.

R.41-42.

Hearing Officer J. Francis Valerga (herein H.O.
Valerga) conducted the Step 5 hearing on August 14 and 15,
2002.

R.231-232.

On December 13, 2002, H.O. Valerga issued

his "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order" denying
Burk and Clark's requested relief.

R.3 97.

On December 19,

2002, Burr and Clark timely appealed to the Step 6 level the Career Service Review Board.

R.431.

After briefing and oral argument, the Career Service
Review Board entered its order styled "Decision and Final
Agency Action" on December 22, 2003, upholding H.O.

9

Valerga's decision denying Burr and Clark's requested
relief.

R.413.

On January 12, 2004, Burr and Clark's

timely filed their Motion for Reconsideration and Supporting
Memorandum.

R.564.

On January 28, 2 0 04, the CSRB denied

Burr and Clark's Motion for Reconsideration in its order
styled "Denial of Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration of
the Step 6 Decision and Final Agency Action Dated December
22, 2003."

R.583.

Burr and Clark timely filed with this Court their
Petition for Review of Final Administrative Agency Decision
on February 25, 2 0 04.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Captains Burr and Clark are, and were, career service

employees at the time of filing their grievance on or about
May 28, 1998.

Burr and Clark are presently employed by the

Utah Department of Corrections.1
the Gunnison Prison.

They are both assigned to

R.231 (Transcript p.103, 125).

Burr

and Clark have requested a four-step pay increase in order

1. During the appeal process, effective January 3, 2 0 04,
Petitioner Burr was promoted from Captain to Deputy Warden.
Said promotion does not materially or adversely impact the
issues at bar but illustrates he is an excellent employee.
10

to compensate them in a manner consistent with other
employees occupying the same position but who have equal or
less education and/or experience.

R.l, R.6, R.231

(Transcript p.109-111).
Burr and Clark have more education and/or experience
than fellow Captains William Carlson ("Carlson") and Randall
Kevin Harr ("Harr") but receive substantially less
compensation per hour.2

R.231 (Transcript p.104, 109-110,

128- 130), R.276 (Grievant's Exhibit 12), a copy of the
relevant transcript pages is highlighted and included in the
Addendum as a part of Exhibit A.

For example, as of April,

2. Burr and Clark earn between $1.93 and $4.33 less per
hour than other individuals within UDOC who occupy the same
classification, but who have less experience and/or
education. Captain Burr has a Bachelor of Science in
Business Management from BYU, has been with UDOC since
September 4, 1990, and has been a Captain since April of
1992. Captain Clark was hired by UDOC on September 2, 1983,
and has been a captain since June of 1993. In their
Grievance, Burr and Clark compared themselves to fellow
Captains Carlson and Captain Harr. Carlson was hired after
Burr and Clark on October 28, 1991, and made captain after
Burr and Clark on September 19, 1993. Although Harr was
hired before Burr (but not Clark) on June 18, 1990, he made
captain after Burr and Clark in September of 1993. Neither
Carlson nor Harr have any educational background or work
experience that would potentially justify their higher
compensation levels. R.231 (Transcript p.104, 109, 128130), R.276 (Grievant's Exhibit 12).
11

2 001, Carlson received $2.3 7 more per hour than Burr and
Harr received $4,33 more per hour than Burr.

Similarly,

Carlson received $2.92 more per hour than Clark.

R.276

(Grievant's Exhibit 12). Accordingly, Burr and Clark
submitted a "pay inequity" grievance alleging that the Utah
Department of Corrections (the

xv

UDOC") had inequitably

applied the Captain salary range as demonstrated by the
substantial differing rates of pay.3
IV.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I: Burr and Clark disputed Hearing Officer J.
Francis Valerga's Finding of Fact No. 2 9 from the CSRB.
R.45 9.

Finding of Fact No. 2 9 found that:
xv

29. Notwithstanding the fact that different
positions, hire dates, budgets, freeze years,
performance evaluations, and career paths
3. It cannot be readily disputed that Carlson and Harr are
proper comparables because the three positions styled
Support Service Supervisor (USSIII") Correctional
Institutional Program Coordinator ("IPC") and Captain are
interchangeable and have been so treated at the
administrative convenience by UDOC. R.231 (Transcript p.28,
29, 47-48, 51). All three positions have the same salary
range, are bench marked to the same job classification and
are all on the same level of the UDOC organizational chart.
R.231 (Transcript p.26, 69), R.246-248.
i?

might potentially account for the differences
in pay between Grievant Burr, Grievant Clark,
Mr. Carlson and Mr. Harr, no specific reasons
were identified for the differences in pay."
R.400.
Burr and Clark marshaled the evidence below and
Respondents did not claim that marshalling to be
insufficient nor did the UDOC dispute Burr and Clark's
arguments but rather merely asserted that Finding of Fact
No. 29 was appropriate.

R.459, R.526-527.

The CSRB

"corrected" Finding of Fact No. 29 but did not rely on the
whole record when it corrected the same.

R.425-426.

Burr

and Clark challenged Finding of Fact No. 29 on the basis
that the only evidence UDOC offered as to the cause of the
difference in pay was as to Carlson an Administrative Salary
Increase (ASI) on March 24, 1994.

R.459-460.

This evidence

was insufficient to rebut Burr and Clark's demonstration of
substantial difference in pay between Burr and Clark and
Messrs. Carlson and Harr.

Burr and Clark satisfied their

burden to prove that a pay difference existed and then the
burden shifted to Respondent to demonstrate a justifiable
reason to support the pay difference.

However, UDOC failed

to meet its burden, therefore Burr and Clark prevailed on
their pay inequity claim.
n *3

POINT II; The CSRB, sub silentio, improperly engaged
in speculation and made a finding of fact in violation of
the residuum rule. At page 14 of the CSRB's Decision, the
CSRB cites "factors" from its Patel decision and then
"finds" those factors were present in this case.

R.42 6. In

doing so, the CSRB explicitly relies on its interpretation
of two (2) exhibits that is wholly unsupported by the record
testimony.

The CSRB's Decision is thus a violation of the

residuum rule and is improperly based on speculation.
POINT III: Executive Director Pete Haun's (E.D. Haun)
denial of Burr and Clark's request for an Administrative
Salary Increase (UASI") was arbitrary and capricious.

The

UDOC had a practice of granting ASI's to remedy internal and
external pay inequities.
(Transcript p.215-216).

R.231 (Transcript p.32), R.232
In fact, at the time Burr and

Clark's grievance was denied by E.D. Haun, he simultaneously
granted a fellow employee an ASI in the amount of seven (7)
steps to remedy a "pay inequity."

R.231 (Transcript p.BB-

SS, 88-89) a copy of the relevant transcript pages is
highlighted and included in the Addendum as a part of
Exhibit A. E.D. Haun's denial was based on the claim that
Burr and Clark had not provided valid comparables and thus

failed to establish that a pay inequity existed.
(Agency Exhibit 1).
(2) reasons.

R.288-289

E.D. Haun's reasoning is flawed for two

First, he failed to compare Burr to Carlson,

despite admitting they were proper comparables.

Second, he

improperly excluded individuals in the IPC and SSIII
positions (i.e. Harr) from the comparison analysis. Burr and
Clark unequivocally demonstrated, and the CSRB so found,
that the positions of IPC, SSIII and Captain are
interchangeable and Messrs. Carlson and Harr were, in fact,
valid comparables.
POINT IV:

R.424 (fn.16).

The CSRB improperly interpreted the

statutory mandates of equal pay for equal work, equitable
application of salary range, and equitable and competitive
compensation as being within the sole purview of DHRM to
correct.

The UDOC has the ability and responsibility to

correct pay inequities vis-a-vis Burr and Clark and Carlson
and Harr as demonstrated by the seven step ASI given to Burr
and Clark's fellow employees. Furthermore, E.D. Chabries
testified that the UDOC's Administrative Law Judge Spencer
Robinson initially requested a declaratory order from DHRM's
E.D. Karen Suzuki-Okabe, as to DHRM's interpretation
regarding this case, but later withdrew the request.
15

R.232

(Transcript p.229-231).

E.D. Chabries further testified

that the issue was to be addressed by him as the Executive
Director of the UDOC and not DHRM.
231).

R.232 (Transcript p. 22 9-

Apparently, the UDOC has admitted that it was its

responsibility to address the pay inequity issue.

Further,

the UDOC is responsible for creating the pay inequity and
should accordingly be held responsible.
POINT V:

Three (3) Utah statutes provide Burr and

Clark their requested relief:

U.C.A. 67-19-12(3)(a) "equal

pay for equal work"; U.C.A. 67-19-12(3) (b) "equitable
application of their salary range"; and, U.C.A. 67-193.1(1) (b) "equitable and competitive compensation."

Burr

and Clark proved that they are in the same classification
(IPC, SSIII and Captain as the same classification),
however, they are paid substantially less then Messrs.
Carlson and Harr who have less education and/or experience
in the Captain level position.

The CSRB improperly frames

Burr and Clark's request as requesting the same/identical
salary and incorrectly interprets the applicable statutes as
providing only a right to the same salary range.

R.422-423.

However, the statutes clearly contemplate equitable
application of their salary range.

Burr and Clark have the

same salary range with Messrs. Carlson and Harr, however,
the salary range is not being equitably applied because
Messrs. Carlson and Harr have less education and/or
experience, but are being paid substantially more, without
justification.

R.231 (Transcript p.26, 69, 104, 109, 128-

130), R.246-248, R.276 (Grievant's Exhibit 2).
ARGUMENT
I
THE CSRB'S DECISION VIOLATES THE WHOLE RECORD
TEST BY IMPROPERLY "CORRECTING" FINDING NO. 29
The CSRB violated the "whole record" test mandated by
its own rule, R137-l-22(4) (a) (2003), and applicable caselaw,
by '"correcting" the Step 5 Hearing Officer's Finding of Fact
Number 29.

CSRB Rule 137-1-22(4) (a) (2003),4 requires the

CSRB to examine the uwhole record" when reviewing the

4. "(4) The Board's Standards of Review. The board's
standards of review based upon the following criteria:
(a) The board shall first make a determination of
whether the factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are
reasonable and rational according to the substantial
evidence standard. When the board determines that the
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are not
reasonable and rational based on the evidentiary/step 5
record as a whole, then the board may, in its discretion,
correct the factual findings, and also make new or
additional factual findings." R137-1-22 (4) (a) . (Emphasis
supplied).
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Hearing Officer's Step 5 Decision.5

Specifically, the CSRB

erroneously attempts to, sua sponte, "correct" Hearing
Officer Valerga's (herein uH.O. Valerga") Finding of Fact
No. 29* by finding that Mr. Carlson's pay increase in March
of 19 94 occurred because Mr. Carlson "temporarily assum[ed]
responsibilities of a higher level position."7

See, the

CSRB's Decision at pages 13-14 and footnote 20 therein.8 In
5. See, also, Grace Drilling Co v. Board of Review, 776
P.2d 63, 68 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989).
6.

H.O. Valerga's Finding of Fact No. 29:
xx

29. Notwithstanding the fact that different
positions, hire dates, budgets, freeze years,
performance evaluations, and career paths might
potentially account for the differences in pay
between Grievant Burr, Grievant Clark, Mr. Carlson
and Mr. Harr, no specific reasons were identified
for the differences in pay." R.400.
7. Also adding implausibility to finding that Mr. Harr's
ASI of $1.50 was justified based on his temporarily assuming
additional responsibilities one would logically expect the
pay increase to also be temporary.
8. It is rather obvious that the CSRB's intent in "finding"
a purported "justification" for the pay discrepancy between
Burr and Clark and Mr. Carlson is a less than subtle attempt
to make the case at bar "fit" within the CSRB's reading of
its prior decision in C.C. Patel v. Div. of Env. Health, 4
CSRB 37 (1991). The CSRB's efforts are troublesome, however,
for three (3) reasons: First, UDOC did not rely on Ms.
Haymond's testimony at Transcript pages 207-210 (R.232
Transcript p. 207-210) in its Step 6 Brief that the CSRB now

the process of "correcting" H.O. Valerga's Finding, the
CSRB's Decision cites to only a portion of the transcript
(i.e., R.232 Transcript p.207-208) which is the only
evidence on the record that supports its decision.

Ms. Kay

Haymond testified regarding her review of Mr. Carlson's
personnel file during a recess in the proceedings that Mr.
Carlson received a special adjustment on March 29, 1994:
"A. [Ms. Haymond] It referred to his acting
in a temporary capacity at a higher level, and
he was awarded an increase for that.
Q. [Mr. Nolan] And what significance does
that have in your judgment?
A. In my judgment it just shows one more
Instance that can affect a person's pay range
or pay rate over a career.
Q. Because assuming some additional
responsibility or other assignment at the
request of management presumably?
A. Correct." R.232 (Transcript p. 207-208).
utilizes to underpin its '"corrected" finding and the CSRB
thus appears to be "searching" for evidence to support the
Respondent's position. Significantly, the Respondent did
not dispute Burr and Clark's marshaling of the evidence as
to Finding No. 29. Second, the Respondent's evidence is
utterly lacking because Ms. Haymond did not, in fact,
analyze any factors that actually caused the pay discrepancy
vis-a-vis Mr. Carlson beyond the March, 1994, ASI granted to
him. R.232 (Transcript p. 195, lines 5-25 and p. 196, lines
1-13). And, finally, the CSRB offers absolutely no
justification for the pay discrepancy between Burr and Clark
and Mr. Harr.

n Q

Ms. Haymond testified that the Special Adjustment
granted to Carlson on March 29, 1994, caused Carlson to
leapfrog in pay ahead of Grievants Burr and Clark.
(Transcript p.192).

R.232

UDOC offered no other evidence

identifying any specific factual justification or
explanation why Messrs. Harr or Carlson are paid at a
substantially higher rate than Burr and Clark.
Although Ms. Haymond testified that different
positions, hire dates, budgets, freeze years, performance
evaluations, and career paths might potentially account for
differences in pay between Burr, Clark, Carlson and Harr,
she did not specifically identify any of those factors as
the actual reasons for the pay disparity. R.232 (Transcript
p. 190-195), a copy of the transcript pages is highlighted
and attached hereto as a part of Exhibit A.
Additionally, the CSRB's corrected finding wholly
ignores Grievant's counsel's re-direct examination of Ms.
Haymond regarding this issue wherein Ms. Haymond
acknowledged that the formal documentation supporting Mr.
Carlson's salary increase reflected that the same was, in

20

fact, an ASI and not due to his temporary duties.
(Transcript p.207-210).

R.2 32

A highlighted copy of transcript

pages 2 07-210 are included in the Addendum as a part of
Exhibit A.

The documentation also did not specify in what

temporary capacity, if any, Mr. Carlson was allegedly
performing or that there was any change in the duties of his
position.

R.232 (Transcript p. 210). Moreover, H.O.

Valerga reviewed and had the benefit of Mr. Carlson's formal
documentation from his personnel file.

R.232 (Transcript p.

210) and clearly made a credibility determination regarding
the implausibility of Ms. Haymond's prior testimony due to
her acknowledgment (on re-direct) that Mr. Carlson had, in
fact, received an ASI without any justification.

A true and

correct copy of the document reviewed by H.O. Valerga
concerning Mr. Carlson's ASI (R.581) is included in the
Addendum as Exhibit B.

The CSRB has therefore violated the

"whole record" test in correcting Finding No. 2 9 and this
Court should reverse the CSRB's decision because the
Respondent did not carry its burden of presenting any
justification for Mr. Carlson's and Mr. Harr's higher
21

compensation.
II
THE CSRB'S SPECULATIVE FINDING OF
FACT REGARDING JUSTIFIABLE FACTORS IS
NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY RECORD EVIDENCE
The CSRB, sub silentio, made a crucial, critical and
new finding of fact that was not supported by any record
testimony presented to the Step 5 Hearing Officer and
thereby engaged in inappropriate speculation as to the
UDOC's purported justification for compensating Grievants
substantially less per hour than Messrs. Carlson and Harr.
At page 14 of the CSRB's Decision, the CSRB cites
"factors" from its Patel decision and then "finds" them to
be present in the case at bar:
"As stated best by the Board in
Patel, variations in employees'
individual salaries "result from such
factors and conditions as promotions,
career mobility assignments, varying
amounts of merit money increases,
legislatively-imposed Statewide salary
freezes, cost of living adjustments
(COLAs) which alter the State pay plans'
entry rates (creating salary
compression), length of service, longterm leaves of absences, interrupted
service and rehirings, reassignments,
disciplinary penalties, and other jobrelated factors.' (Patel at 9 ) .

nn

The Board finds many of these
factors present in the instant case.
(Gvt. Ex.12; Agency Ex. 3) Moreover
Appellants are clearly being paid within
their salary range and have received the
salary increases to which they are
entitled. (Tr.II at 181-182, 191, 209210; Agency Ex. 1)." (Emphasis
supplied). R.426.
The CSRB's reliance on two (2) exhibits, unsupported by
any record testimony explaining those exhibits, violates the
residuum rule9 and constitutes nothing more than mere
9.

The residuum rule provides that:
"Under the residuum rule, all hearsay and other
legally inadmissible evidence admitted by an
agency is set aside by the reviewing court. There
must then remain some "residuum of legal evidence
competent in a court of law," to support the
agency's findings and conclusions of law.
Yacht
Club

v.

Utah Liquor

Control

Comm'n,

681 P.2d 1224,

1226 (Utah 1984). If there is not a residuum of
legally competent evidence remaining the agency
action is reversed.

Compare

Sandy

State

Bank

v.

Brimhall,
636 P.2d 481, 486 (Utah 1981)(residuum
found after hearsay evidence was set aside) with
Williams

v.

Schwendimanf

740 P2d 1354, 1357 (Utah

App. 1987) (no residuum found after inadmissible
evidence was set aside).
Although hearsay evidence is admissible at
administrative hearings:
"Hearsay evidence is admissible in proceedings
before administrative agencies. Id.
However,
findings of fact cannot be based exclusively
on
hearsay evidence; they must be supported by a
residuum of legal evidence competent in a court of
23

speculation on the part of the CSRB.10

Utah Pep't of

Corrections v. Sucher, 796 P.2d 721, 723 (Utah App. Ct.
1990) (Court of Appeals overruled Personnel Review Board's
decision based, in part, on speculation by the Personnel
Review Board).

Simply stated, the CSRB's "finding" is not

law." Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d 449, 450
(Utah App.Ct. 1993), citing Yacht Club v. Utah
Liquor Control Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah
1984) .
10. It is the absence of any record testimony that would
support the CSRB's interpretation of the exhibits in
question that is such an egregious violation of the Residuum
Rule. The exhibits in question are Grievants' (Burr and
Clark's) Exhibit 12 and Agency's (UDOC's) Exhibit 3. Copies
of Grievant's Exhibit 12 and Agency's Exhibit 3 are attached
to the Addendum as a part of Exhibit C. R.2 76-2 85
(Grievant's Exhibit 12), R.292-293 (Agency's Exhibit 3 ) .
Grievant's Exhibit 12 is a summary exhibit which
demonstrates the pay inequity between Burr and Clark and
Messer's Carlson and Harr. R.231 (Transcript p.104,109,
128-130). Agency's Exhibit 3 constitutes Ms. Haymond's
analysis of captain salaries. R.232 (Transcript p.168-169).
However, the CSRB solely relied on the exhibits without any
identification of any evidence that would support any
specific factors justifying the pay inequity. The exhibits
alone, constitute hearsay. Hoskins v. Industrial Comm'n of
Utah, 918 P.2d 105, 158 (Utah Ct.App. 1991). While
admissible at the administrative level, the administrative
decision cannot be solely based on hearsay, but must be
supported by a residuum of legally competent evidence. The
CSRB plainly relied solely on the exhibits, which is a
violation of the residuum rule. This violation of the
residuum rule is prejudicial error because there is no
evidence to support the CSRB's finding.

based on any citation to testimony presented at the Step 5
evidentiary hearing because no such testimony exists.11

The

CSRB's "finding" is thus nothing more than uwishful
thinking"12 and the same cannot underpin the CSRB's
determination that UDOC had a bona fide justification for
the pay discrepancies in question in this case because no
such justification exists in the record testimony.

Ill
E.D. HAUNT'S DECISION CONSTITUTES
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
The DHRM rule that was in effect at the time Burr and
Clark filed their grievance provides that administrative
salary increases (herein ASI) are justified for equity
11. To the contrary, Ms. Haymond specifically testified
that her general statements of "factors" that could, in the
abstract, affect pay differences (i.e. salary freezes,
performance evaluations, or hired at different rates) but
admitted she did not do any analysis of any of these
"factors" on the case at bar. R.232 (Transcript p. 190-192,
195) .
12. Ms. Haymond did testify that some of the duties of an
SSIII require special training but there was no evidence
presented by UDOC that Mr. Harr or Carlson had any special
training that would justify their greater compensation
levels. R.232 (Transcript p.197-198).

oc

issues, R477-7-4(11):
(12) Administrative Salary Increase
•The executive director or commissioner
authorizes and approves Administrative Salary
increases under the following parameters:
(c) Justifications for Administrative Salary
Increases shall be:
(iv) Supported by issues such as: special
agency conditions or problems, equity
issues, or other unique situations or
considerations in the agency." R477-74(11) (c) (2000) (Emphasis supplied) .
E.D. Haun acted arbitrarily and capriciously in at
least two (2) ways when he denied the grievance of Burr and
Clark.13
First, E.D. Haun treated Burr and Clark inconsistently
by denying their grievance but granting Mr. Brathwaite's
seven (7) step salary increase.14

The Utah Administrative

13. Statutory interpretations that are not agency specific
are not given deference by the courts. Ferro v. Utah
Department of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah App. 1992);
Employers Reinsurance Fund v. Industrial Commission of Utah,
856 P.2d 648, 650 (Utah App. 1993).
14. Once E.D. Haun decided to exercise his discretion to
grant any ASI to any agency employee because of an internal
pay inequity, E.D. Haun (in so doing) established an agency
practice that such discretion will be exercised when pay
inequity circumstances exist as to any Agency personnel.
Simply stated, E.D. Haun cannot (consistent with merit

Procedures Act provides for relief if:
"(h) the agency action is:
(v)

an abuse of discretion
delegated to the agency by
statute;
(vi) contrary to a rule of the
agency;
(vii) contrary to the agency's prior
practice, unless the agency
justifies the inconsistency
by giving facts and reason
that demonstrate a fair and
rational basis for the
inconsistency; or
(viii) otherwise arbitrary or
capricious." (Emphasis
supplied) . U.C.A. 63-46 (b)16(4) (h) (1988) .
Significantly, E.D. Haun's final decision (R.288
(Agency Exhibit 1)) did not distinguish Mr. Braithwaite's
circumstance on classification grounds but rather was based
on the claim that Grievants had not provided valid
comparables.15

Remedying a statutory pay inequity as to one

principles) grant an ASI to one employee so as to remedy a
pay inequity and then deny another employee's request on the
sole basis that he has discretion to do so under DHRM rules.
Such a circumstance would be the essence of an arbitrary and
capricious decision.
15. Specifically, E.D. Haun claimed that comparing Burr and
Clark to anyone other than Messrs. Liston and Carlson, who
on

classification but refusing to remedy a statutory pay
inequity as to other employees based solely on the fact that
the employees in question occupied different classifications
is the essence of arbitrary and capricious decision making
because it is nothing more than blatant favoritism.16

The

Utah Court of Appeals in Pickett has provided guidance in

were "titled" as Captains, was comparing "apples to oranges"
from E.D. Haun's viewpoint. R.2 88 (Agency Exhibit 1, page
1, paragraph 4). E.D. Haun's analysis is arbitrary and
capricious because it is factually unsupported by the record
evidence in this case. Specifically, E.D. Haun improperly
examined only those comparables who had an "official
Captain" title when issuing his Step 4 decision and did not
appropriately consider time by Burr and Clark in the
positions of IPC, SSIII and Captain. Comparison within
these three (3) positions is appropriate and necessary based
on the evidence presented at the Step 5 hearing
demonstrating that the titles of IPC, SSIII and Captain
constitute interchangeable positions and have been so
treated by UDOC management have the same salary range,
benchmark and level on organizational chart. E.D. Haun's
conclusion that comparing the IPC, SSIII and Captain titles
constitutes an "apples to oranges" analysis is thus
factually unsupportable.
16. Such a result is wholly inconsistent with the
Legislature's requirement that the USPMA be interpreted and
implemented in a manner that recognizes the "merit
principles" of "equitable and competitive compensation."
See, Section 67-19-3.1 (1) (b)&(2) . Moreover, Burr and Clark
posit that the UDOC's "blatant favoritism" would likewise
fall within the "catchall" provision contained in the
Administrative Procedures Act wherein an agency action is
reversible if "otherwise arbitrary and capricious." See,
U.C.A. 63-46b-16(4) (h) (iv) .
Ofi

interpreting subsection 16(4) (h) (iii) :
u

We agree with Justice Durham7 s
analysis that this section requires
a petitioner to establish as a prima
facie case that the administrative
agency's action in his or her case
was 'contrary to the agency's prior
practice,' If a petitioner meets
this burden, section 16(4) (h) (iii)
unambiguously requires that 'the
agency justif[y] the inconsistency'
with prior decisions. Therefore, as
noted by Justice Durham,
establishing a prima facie case by
preponderance of the evidence shifts
the burden to the agency to
'demonstrate a fair and rational'
basis for the departure from
precedent in the instant case...."
Pickett v. Utah Department of
Commerce, 858 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah
App. 1993). (Emphasis supplied).
Grievants have the initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case that they have been treated inconsistently.
Grievants met their burden by demonstrating Mr. Brathwaite
contemporaneously received17 a seven step ASI for "equity
issues" at the same time Burr and Clark's claim was denied.
R.231 (Transcript p.85-86, 88-89).

Further evidence of

UDOC's prior practice is demonstrated by E.D. Chabries and
17. E.D. Chabries also testified that ASI's were given
"across the board" to rectify external pay inequities for
Captains in UDOC. R. 232 (Transcript p.215-216).
OQ

Ms. Haymond's testimony that the UDOC has addressed pay
inequity issues in the past - both internal inequities
(i.e., within UDOC - Mr. Braithwaite) and external
inequities (i.e., pay raises based on comparisons to other
governmental entities) R.232 (Transcript p.215-216, 88-89).
Grievants further met their burden by comparing themselves
to fellow employees Messrs. Carlson and Harr.

It is

uncontroverted that Messrs. Carlson and Harr are proper
comparables who receive substantially more compensation then
Burr and Clark.

As a result, the burden shifted to UDOC to

demonstrate a "fair and rational" basis for UDOC's
inconsistent with prior practice treatment of Grievants.18
18. The H.O. erroneously held that UAPA does not apply at
the Step 4 level. The Utah Court of Appeals in Lunnen v.
Utah Dept. of Transportation, 886 P.2d 70 (Utah Ct. App.
1995)(cert, denied) held that (as to disciplinary actions)
the Step 4 decisions must be consistently applied. Although
Lunnen involved discipline, and Burr and Clark's claim is a
pay inequity case, Burr and Clark are unaware of any
statutory provisions in UAPA or the Grievance and Appeals
Statutes that permit different due process standards be
applied to grievances initiated by an employee rather then
an Agency. Inasmuch as Lunnen was predicated on
constitutional due process standards, Burr and Clark submit
Lunnen persuasively applies to the case at bar on this
issue.

UDOC presented no specific evidence explaining why Grievants
were treated inconsistently with either Brathwaite or
Carlson and Harr.

UDOC action is thus inconsistent with

prior practice and arbitrary and capricious.19
E.D. Haun further acted arbitrarily and capriciously by
performing an incomplete comparison in his final order.
E.D. Haun's comparison is incomplete in two (2) ways.
First, at no point in his final order did E.D. Haun
compare Petitioner Burr to Carlson despite admitting that
Grievants were comparable to Carlson:
"With all the people of whom Mr.
Burr and Mr. Clark sought to compare
themselves, only two were classified
as captains during the times
relevant to these grievances, Liston
and Will Carlson. Any other
comparison is apples to oranges."
R.288-289 (Agency Exhibit 1).
Second, E.D. Haun's comparison was incomplete in that
he excluded the comparables of those Captains holding the
position of IPC and SSIII (i.e. Harr).

Grievants have

19. The arbitrary and capricious standard also applies
under CSRB Rule 137-1-21(3).

demonstrated in the Step 5 Hearing that the positions of
IPC, SSIII and Captain are all interchangeable, all in the
same salary range and all have the same level of supervisory
duties.20

Further, E.D. Haun thus acted arbitrarily and

capriciously in failing to award Grievants their requested
remedy.21

20. At Burr and Clark's request and after briefing the
issue, the CSRB overruled the H.O. and determined that the
position of IPC, SSIII and Captain are all interchangeable.
R.424-425 (fn.18).
21.

Further, Clark testified that:
"A. (BY LOWELL CLARK) No, it was a
meeting with Mr. Haun.
Q. (BY MR. DYER) And why don't you
describe for us what happened during the
meeting with Mr. Haun.
A. During the meeting he wanted to know
our issues of the grievance that we had
filed and why we felt like we had some
action coming in that. During the course
of the grievance we discussed other
occurrences that we felt justified
something to be done for us. Mr. Haun
invited us to take this issue to court.
It was his feeling - that was projected
to me anyway - it was his feeling that
the legislature or whoever give him his
authority had given him the
responsibility to do ASI's to maintain
equity, but they did not give him the
money to do that, and he was desirous of
somebody taking it someplace where they
22

IV
THE CSRB ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT DHRM IS
SOLELY RESPONSIBLE TO REMEDY PAY INEQUITIES
The Attorney General's Office has taken inconsistent
positions before the CSRB concerning whether the USPMA
applies only to State agencies or DHRM.22
would be forced to give that money.
Q. So you understood Mr. Haun telling
you to go ahead and appeal it because
that way he -would be forced to do it.
A. Yes." R. 231 (Transcript p. 134) A
copy of which is highlighted and included
in the addendum as a part of Exhibit A.
Nonetheless, any potential lack of funding was not a
defense raised by UDOC at the Step 5 Hearing. R.232
(Transcript p.225).
22. In Draughon v. Dept. of Fin. Instit., 975 P.2d 935,
938-39 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999), the Utah Court of Appeals'
reliance on Lewis Carroll is both poignant and pertinent to
the matter at bar, to-wit:
u

We agree with the appellant's
counsel that Human Resource's rules
distinguishing between a demotion and
an involuntary reassignment are
comparable to a memorable exchange
between Alice and Humpty Dumpty:
"'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty
said in a rather scornful tone, xit
means just what I choose it to mean-nothing more nor less.' vThe
question is,' said Alice, 'whether
you can make word mean different
things.' xThe question is,' said
Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be
master--that' s all.'" Lewis Carroll,
^

In contrast to the Department of Health's position in
the case cited in footnote 22 the UDOC took a contradictory
position, to-wit: the USPMA' s reference to "department"
applies only to DHRM and not the UDOC.

Grievants submit the

Attorney General office's "new" interpretation is wrong for
several reasons.
First, E.D. Chabries testified that UDOC's ALJ, Spencer
Robinson, requested a declaratory order from Ms. Okabe
regarding DHRM's interpretation in regards to this case, but

Through the Looking Glass and What
Alice Found There 123 (1941). Id.
Much like Humpty Dumpty, the Attorney General's Office
must believe it is the umaster" of the USPMA. For example,
in Melody Staples v. Utah Department of Health,
19CSRB/H.0.275 [rev'd on other grounds 8 CSRB 71 (Step 6,
2004)), Burr and Clark's counsel argued that the USPMA
statutorily defined "department" to refer to DHRM and
therefore the USPMA statutory provisions regarding
termination of a career service employee required Ms. Karen
Suzuki-Okabe (as "head" of the "department" - i.e. DHRM) to
conduct all Step 4 Loudermill hearings under Section 67-1918(5)(a-e) of the USPMA. H.O. Guyon rejected Burr and
Clark's counsel's argument and instead accepted Deputy A.G.
Laurie Noda's argument that the phrase "department head"
essentially means the same as "agency head." A copy of ALJ
Guyon's decision is included in the Addendum as Exhibit D.
Copies of Burr and Clark's counsel's brief in the Staples
matter and Ms. Noda's Reply Brief in the Staples matter were
previously attached to Grievants' Posthearing Reply Brief as
exhibit A thereto. R.355-394.

then the request was withdrawn because this matter was one
to be addressed by UDOC's E.D. not DHRM.

R.232 (Transcript

p. 228-231), highlighted and included in the Addendum as a
part of Exhibit A.

Ms. Haymond further testified that ASI's

are within "the sole discretion of the executive director of
each agency of commissioner."

R.232 (Transcript p.204-205)

highlighted and included in the Addendum as a

part of

Exhibit A.
Second, the UDOC's argument ignores the fact that all
Utah state agencies (including the UDOC) are required to
comply with the USPMA.

Third, the UDOC (not DHRM) is

factually responsible for the pay inequity circumstance in
the case at bar because it (not DHRM) granted Carlson and
Harr "special adjustment/pay increase" without supporting
justification whatsoever for this ufair-haired son"
preferential treatment.23

And lastly, the UDOC has failed

23. The UDOC's failure to dispute that portion of Burr and
Clark's Posthearing Brief concerning the facts is
particularly on point in this context. Specifically,
paragraph 38, at page 10 of Burr and Clark's Posthearing
Brief, Burr and Clark maintain:
u

3 8.

Grievants submit that the Agency

to identify any legitimate business reasons that would
support the pay inequity circumstances when comparing
Grievants and Carlson and Harr.24

offered no specific evidence identifying
any specific factual justification or
explanation why Harr or Carlson are paid
at a higher rate than Burr or Clark."
R.311.
The UDOC did not challenge paragraph 3 8 in its Reply
nor did it present any evidence that DHRM was exclusively
responsible for the pay inequity circumstance demonstrated
by the record evidence in this case. Ostensibly, the UDOC
presented no such evidence because (in the worst case
scenario) it does not exist or (in the best case scenario)
the UDOC affirmatively created the pay inequity circumstance
herein and DHRM merely "blessed" the UDOC's actions in
performance of its ministerial functions.
24. Significantly, the CSRB and UDOC ignore the fact that
pay inequities without legitimate business reasons
implicitly must be remedied. See, F. Donald B. Campbell, et
al. v. Utah Department of Human Resource Management,
12CSRB/H.0.170(1994)("there is not law or rule that requires
employees to receive the same salaries or salary increases
if the differences are reached upon legitimate business
reasons.")(Emphasis supplied). Significantly, the UDOC
cited the foregoing quote from Campbell "verbatim" in its
Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss date
June 15, 2001, and which is contained on file in this
matter.

V
INEQUITABLE APPLICATION OF THE
CAPTAIN LEVEL SALARY RANGE AND
COMPENSATION ENTITLES GRIEVANTS TO
PREVAIL ON THEIR GRIEVANCE
A, Burr and Clark Are Entitled To Their 4 Step Salary
Increase Based On Their Statutory Right Under The USPMA To
Equal Pay For Equal Work, Equitable Application Of Their
Salary Range And Equitable And Competitive Compensation.
Grievants have a statutory right under the provisions
of the USPMA to be compensated equally and equitably.
Specifically, in U.C.A. 67-19-12(3) (a), the Legislature has
mandated that every career service employee is entitled to
equal pay for equal work:
u

(3)(a) The director shall25 prepare,
maintain, and revise a position classification
plan for each employee position not exempted
under Subsection (2) to provide equal pay for
equal work." Utah Code Annotated 67-1912(3) (a) (1997) (Emphasis supplied) .
Second, in U.C.A. 67-19-12(3) (b), the Legislature has
mandated that each career service employee is entitled to

25. It cannot be disputed that the Legislature's use of the
word "shall" constitutes a mandatory obligation on state
agencies under the USPMA. Significantly, UDOC has not
identified any DHRM rule that implements or interprets the
USPMA provisions in question. Ostensibly, UDOC's omission
is not their fault because none appear to exist.

•5 n

have his/her salary range applied equitably to him/her:26
"(3)(b) Classification of positions shall27 be
based upon similarity of duties performed and
responsibilities assumed, so that the same job
requirements and the same salary range may be
applied equitably to each position in the same
class." Utah Code Annotated 67-1912(3) (b) (1997) (Emphasis supplied) .
Third, inU.C.A. 67-19-3.1 (1) (b) , the Legislature
mandated the career service must provide for equitable
compensation:
67-19-3.1. Principles governing
interpretation of chapter and adoption of
rules.
(1) The department shall28 establish a career
service system designed in a manner that will
provide for the effective implementation of
the following merit principles:
(b) providing for equitable and competitive
compensation." Utah Code Annotated 67-193.1(1) (b) (2000) (Emphasis supplied) .

26. Under the USPMA, DHRM is responsible for establishing
the salary range and establishment of the same is not
grievable under U.C.A. 67-19-12(4)(ix). Individual and,
hence, equitable application of the salary range to any
person (i.e. Burr and Clark) is, however, an agency
function, responsibility and obligation under U.C.A. 67-199(2) .
27.

See, footnote 25 hereinabove.

28.

Id.

Under these three (3) provisions in the USPMA, the
Legislature has unequivocally created a right in career
service employees (including Burr and Clark) to equal pay
for equal work; equitable application of Burr and Clark's
salary range based on an equal pay for equal work premise;
and that Burr and Clark receive equitable and competitive
compensation.

Once Burr and Clark established violation of

the foregoing statutes, they need not prove a violation of
DHRM rules because "rules are subordinate to statutes and
cannot confer greater rights or disabilities."
v. Holnam, 29 P.3d 629, 631 (Utah 2001).

Morgan Co.

UDOC also

misinterprets the law when it argues that the absence of
agency rules vitiates Grievants' rights created and
protected under the USPMA.29

29. The CSRB relies on three (3) cases (Pitkin, Lund and
Patel) for the proposition that "equity alone is not
enough." Burr and Clark's claim that there has been an
inequitable application of their salary range, an arbitrary
and capricious action by the Executive Director in denying
their grievance, and that they have been financially harmed
by receiving less pay than they are entitled to receive.
Burr and Clark rely on three (3) statutes, and do not rely
on 'equity' per se.
In Patel, the CSRB denied Mr. Patel any relief because
*2 Q

he was an Engineer IV and his comparable was an Engineer
III. The CSRB acknowledged, however, that the uequal pay
for equal work" statutory provision in the USPMA xx insures"
that the equal pay concept applies within job
classifications, to-wit:
u

The pay range should reflect equal pay
for equal work. (See UCA 67-19-12(4))
The concept of equal pay for equal
work is confined to employees within
the same classification. Equal pay is
not, as Mr. Patel argues, a generic
concept comparing duties in different
classifications. Mr. Patel is insured
[of] equal pay for equal work within
his classification." (Highlighted
emphasis in original.) Patel v.
Division of Environmental Health, 4
CSRB 3 7 (Underline emphasis supplied).
Since Burr and Clark are, for the purpose of this case,
within the same classification that is encompassed by the
"titles" denominated as "IPC," "SSIII" and "Captain," Burr
and Clark assert the Patel decision supports Burr and
Clark's statutory interpretation/argument in this case.
Pitkin involved a classification issue, wherein the
Hearing Officer concluded that the job duties and
responsibilities were the same, and awarded compensation
adjustment from the date of the grievance. Not only did the
Burr and Clark in that case prevail, but the Hearing Officer
further provided that, uthe facts and circumstances of this
particular appeal are such that that little, if any,
precedence would apply to other non-related cases."
Division of Env'l Health v. Pitkin, 2 PRB 15, 11 (Step 6)
(1984). Pitkin involved no statute.
Lund involved a discretionary Personnel Management Rule
from 1985 that provided:
"A one or two step increase may be
granted to employees who successfully

CONCLUSION
Burr and Clark respectfully request this Court reverse
the CSRB's Decision and order the UDOC to grant Burr and
Clark a four (4) step pay increase, retroactive to the date
of the initial filing of their grievance on May 28, 1998.
DATED this

^

day of

^UL

, 2004.

Respectfully submitted,

(W, S-\*.
PhillipJW. D^er, Esq.
Carey A. Seager, Esq.
Attorneys for Grievants
MI/E /client/UPEA/UGOP/Burr and Clark/Appeal Brief (Court of Appeals)

complete six months of probation." Lund
v. Division of Health Care Financing, 3
PRB 24, at page 6 (Step 6, 1997)
(Emphasis supplied).
The PRB Board determined that the use of the word "may"
and the absence of a statute made the rule discretionary.
This is distinguished from Burr and Clark's case because
UDOC violated the USPMA.
So even if there existed an agency rule implementing the
three (3) statutes hereinabove quoted, no agency rule could
limit the rights provided by the USPMA and UDOC's decision
will not be afforded deference. See, Draughon v. Dept. of
Financial Institutions, 975 P.2d 935, 937 (Utah App. 1999).
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